A familiar-looking email can hide an unexpected threat. Pause and verify unusual requests before clicking or sharing information.

The Message in Disguise: How to Spot Phishing Emails

Phishing emails can look like the messages your employees handle every day. Imagine a familiar vendor requesting updated payment details before an invoice comes due. Or a manager sending a document that requires an unexpected sign-in. The name looks right, the timing seems reasonable, and the request fits into a busy workday.

As part of our Halloween series, this is the message in disguise: an ordinary-looking request that deserves closer attention. The practical question is not whether employees can spot every suspicious email. It is whether your business gives them a reliable way to verify consequential requests before acting.

That distinction matters for owners and managers. Employees need more than reminders to be careful. They need clear verification rules, dependable reporting options, and permission to pause when something changes.

Phishing uses deceptive messages to persuade someone to share information, open something harmful, or take another unsafe action. The FTC’s phishing guidance for small businesses describes messages impersonating vendors, clients, and coworkers. Familiarity supplies a reason to pay attention. An urgent deadline can then supply a reason to skip the usual checks.

Some messages use a recognizable display name with an unrelated or slightly altered email address. Others come from legitimate accounts that an attacker has taken over. Microsoft documents how compromised mailboxes can send messages inside and outside an organization. A correct-looking sender address therefore cannot establish that the request itself is authorized.

Business email compromise, often shortened to BEC, describes scams using apparently legitimate business messages to obtain money or information. The FBI’s business email compromise guidance includes requests appearing to come from familiar vendors or executives. A fraudulent payment instruction can cause harm without a malicious attachment. The employee’s action is what the sender is trying to influence.

Woman inspecting a letter as a businessman removes a mask to reveal a zombie face, illustrating deceptive phishing emails.

Spelling mistakes, an unfamiliar address, or an unexpected attachment can justify extra scrutiny. However, professional wording and a recognizable signature do not prove a message is genuine. A useful question is: “What is this asking us to do differently?” Changes to payments, access, or information sharing deserve particular attention.

Urgency alone does not establish fraud; real business requests can be urgent. The concern grows when urgency comes with secrecy, changed instructions, or pressure to bypass an established approval. Treat those combinations as reasons to verify. Employees do not need to identify phishing emails with certainty before asking for help.

Consider how these requests should be handled within your business:

Familiar-Looking Request What Needs Verification Safer Next Step
A vendor changes its bank details Whether the vendor authorized the change Call an established contact using a number already on file
An executive requests an unusual purchase Whether the purchase and approval are genuine Confirm through the established approval process
A coworker shares an unexpected document Whether the document and access request were expected Confirm with the coworker through a known channel
A manager requests employee or customer records Whether the request is authorized and the destination appropriate Check with the information owner before sharing

These checks should focus on actions with meaningful consequences. Staff should not have to investigate every routine email from scratch. Define which requests require confirmation, then make that confirmation part of normal work.

A practical process should be easy to explain and usable during a busy afternoon. Employees need to know when to stop, whom to contact, and what happens next. Assign responsibility for each step before a suspicious request arrives. Otherwise, uncertainty can push people toward either acting too quickly or leaving important work unresolved.

When something is unusual, hold off on sending money, releasing records, opening unexpected files, or entering credentials. Identify the action being requested and whether it follows the normal process. A claim that a manager is unavailable should not remove an approval requirement. It should trigger the designated backup contact.

Give employees a simple response they can use with legitimate coworkers and vendors: “I need to verify this through our process.” Managers should support that response even when a request is genuinely urgent. A rule loses value if senior employees routinely expect exceptions.

Use a known phone number, an established internal directory, or another approved method independent of the suspicious message. Do not rely on a new number supplied in that message or its attachment. The FBI recommends verifying payment requests and changes to account information directly with the requester. Calling an established contact helps separate the confirmation from the questionable email.

Confirm the specific change, not simply whether the person sent an email. For a payment update, ask whether the bank details actually changed and follow your approved vendor-update procedure. Replying to the same thread is not independent verification. Someone controlling that mailbox may also receive and answer the reply.

For an unexpected sign-in request, open the service through your normal bookmark or approved application. Avoid using the message’s link to investigate whether its login page is legitimate. If the requested item is unclear, ask IT or the sender through an established channel.

Tell employees exactly how to report a suspicious message, whether through an approved reporting button or a designated support contact. Assign someone to monitor those reports and provide guidance. Include a backup route for urgent concerns and an option outside email if an account may be compromised.

Encourage reporting even after someone has clicked, replied, or shared information. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre guidance explains why blaming employees can discourage reporting. A useful first response is to thank the person and establish what happened. Fast, accurate information gives the response team a better starting point.

Finance should own the rules for payment changes, with management backing and IT support. Specify who confirms new bank details, who approves the change, and where confirmation is recorded. For sensitive changes, consider separate people for verification and approval. Two approvals are less useful if both people rely only on the same questionable email.

Apply comparable rules to payroll updates, sensitive records, and requests for new system access. Name backup approvers so vacations and deadlines do not create an informal exception process. Keep trusted vendor contact information current. An outdated phone list makes a sensible policy harder to follow.

Practice the process using short discussions based on work your team actually performs. Ask who would verify a supplier change or an unexpected executive request. Review whether employees found the correct contact and whether someone answered promptly. Those observations help identify practical gaps without turning training into a test of who is easiest to fool.

Employee judgment should be one part of the defense. Ask IT how your email filtering, account protection, and reporting process work together. The NCSC recommends combining technical measures, business processes, and user education. No training program can make employees identify every deceptive message.

The FTC explains how email authentication helps verify a message’s sending domain. Ask IT whether those protections are configured for your business. They help address impersonation, but they do not approve a payment or establish a sender’s business intent. Verification procedures still matter when a message comes from a compromised account.

CISA recommends multifactor authentication, with stronger phishing-resistant options where available. Ask which methods protect your email accounts and whether improvements are needed. OSC’s overview of stronger Microsoft authentication options offers additional background. Stronger sign-in protection supports account security, while approval procedures address what people are persuaded to do.

Report the incident immediately and tell IT what happened: a click, download, password entry, approval, information disclosure, or payment. Include the time and preserve the original message according to your response process. Do not assume that deleting the email resolves the issue. IT needs to assess the account, device, and information involved.

Microsoft’s compromised-account response guidance includes reviewing sessions, authentication methods, application permissions, and mailbox forwarding. That is why changing a password may be only part of the response. Let the response team determine the required actions and when normal work can safely resume.

If money was sent, contact your financial institution immediately through its established fraud channel. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center guidance recommends requesting a recall or reversal and filing a detailed complaint. Recovery is not guaranteed. Do not wait for the internal investigation to finish before contacting the bank.

Would Your Team Know How to Verify an Unusual Request?

Onsite Computing can help review your email security, account protections, and suspicious-message reporting process. We can work with your team to identify gaps and clarify when employees should pause, verify, or escalate.

Phishing emails become harder to act on when unusual requests meet consistent checks. Your team needs clear approval rules, trusted contact details, and a reporting process that produces a response. Leaders make those protections useful by following the same rules and supporting employees who pause.

Onsite Computing can help you review the technical protections and everyday practices behind that process. Contact Onsite Computing to discuss how your business handles suspicious messages and verifies consequential requests.


Yes. An attacker can use a compromised mailbox to send messages from a legitimate address. Verify unusual requests independently, even when the sender is familiar.

No. A reply may reach the same person controlling the suspicious message or mailbox. Use established contact details and your normal approval process.

Yes. A message may ask someone to send money or disclose information directly. The risk can come from following the instructions.

No. MFA helps protect sign-ins, with phishing-resistant methods offering stronger protection. It does not prevent an authorized employee from acting on fraudulent payment instructions.

Contact IT or the designated response team immediately. Explain whether they entered information, downloaded anything, or approved a prompt. Avoid further interaction and follow the response team’s instructions.

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